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Randwulf
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Principles of War Wed, 11 January 2006 16:41
Principles of War... not if... ugh...

He who masters the most will win the most....

The Principle of:
1. Objective
2. Offensive
3. Mass
4. Economy of Force
5. Movement
6. Suprise
7. Security
8. Simplicity
9. Cooperation

A lot has happened to warfare in the last 200 years, but the basics are still the same. It's how you use them thats changed.

How do we tanslate this into Game terms?

#1 Objective. This is to win, to acomplish the goals of the scenario be it kill units, or capture objectives or both in many cases.

#2 Offensive: you have to shoot at the enemy, every chance you get with the most dice you can get.

#3 Mass: This is your army, the better the force the better your chance.

#4 Economy of Force: This is how well you use your mass. And how well you play your cards. Concentration of firepower.

#5 Movement: This is how you manuver, be it in the attack or to shore up your defence

#6 Suprise: Ambush, attack where he is not expecting it. Lay a trap or just sucker him into range. Play a card he is not ready for. This is also where luck comes into play... always better to be lucky.

#7 Security: This in game terms is your cards, some times you can bluff, other times you just keep him from knowing what your gonna do?

#8 Simplcity: keep it simple, don't plan an attack that uses four of your cards over the next 6 turns... don't complicate the attack with if's and maybes. Two turns out is the most your enemy will let you do most of the time, without trying to muck up your plans with plans of his own.

#9 Cooperation: Combined arms wins battles, fire your units so they help each other, think of the odds on the dice for the type of unit your gonna hit. Do you need more or do you have to much? Can you hit another target and eliminate it instead? Do you want to eliminate or just wear down?



So after a game go down the list, check off who did what better. you may notice that the player that got the most checks was also the player that won...

Now class... for a gold star... who can tell me who came up with these rules of war?

[Aktualisiert am: Fri, 13 January 2006 01:22] vom Moderator

      
GeneralV
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 16:56
My guess is Tsun Tzu.
      
Fixpix
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 16:56
Sun Tzu?
      
GeneralV
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 16:59
Thought I may have spelled it wrong. But I was talking about the Chinese General in any event.
      
Jarek2
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:01
Napoleon Bonaparte
      
Randwulf
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:03
um.... no. EEEEEEEEEEAAAAAAAA.... thank you for playing next contestant please...

think europe..... but I can see Sun Tsu coming up with something similer...

but that list is even taught at our millitary schools...

      
Cantatta
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:09
Hannibal Barca is my choice! He singlehandedly instructed the Romans in warfare during the Second Punic War by beating them soundly battle after battle, even though his army was outnumbered, for more than 16 years, and he did it in the Roman's back yard, at will. The Romans knew brute force and used it to good effect, but that was all they knew. Hannibal taught them tactics, albeit the hard way.

Sun Tzu may have written it down, but Hannibal Barca put it all to use long before that. In my humble estimate, Hannibal is an even greater General than Alexander or Fredrick the Great, who both had such vast armies that few could have stood against them anyway. Hannibal won when the odds were against him, and he never outnumbered his opponents by any important margin, if ever, more often than not fighting as the weaker army. But always prevailing.

[Aktualisiert am: Wed, 11 January 2006 22:29]

      
Randwulf
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:11
ok a little hint...

Dead German General that had his writing published after he died.... then rewrote by the US War department in 1921 as training regulation no.10-5
      
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:14
oh if Hannible could only have wrote stuff down for us... oh that would have changed history....
      
Nordiskanc
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:26
Clausewitz..."On War"

[Aktualisiert am: Wed, 11 January 2006 20:18]

      
Randwulf
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 17:36
DING DING DING... we have a winner....


a true student of history... or someone that know how to do an advanced google search....

you get a gold star Nordiskanc...

you may take a yellow highlighter pen and draw a star on the back of your hand...

ok, did you know or did you google? lol
      
Rolld6
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 18:02
There is an old Latin saying, "Plague take those who spoke our wisdom before us". The old German was an obvious student of Sun Tzu. Cool

TTFN,

John
      
Nordiskanc
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 18:20
Actually I'm a teacher, so I do know much about the subject. I'll take that 'gold star' in the form of a green star next time I use a 'medics and mechanics' card Very Happy
      
Randwulf
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 18:53
well Nordy, if we ever get to play then I'll let you...

as for SunTzu, I don't think to many Napoleonic era Generals even knew of him... don't know if thats a good or bad thing... not much translation at the time...

But I am sure they studied as much Hannibal as they could find record for... so much has been lost or just misplaced... This being the information age we know more now just by being able to gather it all together.... A hundered years ago you would have had to lived at a university to have been able to learn just a fraction of what is avalable to a high school student now...

and to think we know so much, and we still make the same mistakes over and over...

human race as a whole must be insane....

      
Provence
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 19:50
The thing is that we think we know a bunch but it's usually theory - stuff we've read in Clausewitz for example (which, by the way, is not exactly easy reading). In reality, we seldom have time to apply principles in real life. Even those who in situations to apply them, like generals during war, don't always do so. I just finished reading AN ARMY AT DAWN on WWII in North Africa and it is amazing how seldomly the Americans applied those famous principles.

So, that's the beauty of Memoir'44. It is short enough that lucky gamers get to play lots of games and therefore try to apply those principles so as to truly integrate them. We even get to have the luxury of learning the hard way and growing from our mistakes - something real life generals don't always have the opportunity to do.

The other cool thing is that war games still have the "fog of war", the uncertainties and unpredictable elements (random cards, dice, emotional human element), that make applying the rational principles of war much more challenging.

[Aktualisiert am: Wed, 11 January 2006 19:51]

      
Mr & Mrs Guderian
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 20:42
Off the top of my head, I think that Sun Tzu was originally published in France around 1789. Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, I probably am.
      
Mr & Mrs Guderian
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 21:02
Clausewitz is so boring my head falls off. Every time I try to push through it, I either want to kill myself or re-arrange my sock drawer. Its the language really - why use one word, when about a thousand dull ones will do. Sun Tzu is much better, if dated. Anyone read Jomini? Still, theory is no substitute for hands-on experience.

By the way their are a number of versions of the Ten Principles Of War used by a number of Commonwealth Armed Forces. The version I've assembled is based on THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL, VOL 1, NO 6, 1947/48, the best one I think, but I first heard of it from the British Army Council, 1950. Legend has it that it was originally written by a British Officer, or a group of them, from the Second World War as just a record of their shared experience between fellow officers. It picked up in popularity but was never published in its own right but nearly everybody uses it. It was used once that i know of in Frank Kitson's Directing Operations. For those of you who are interested:

MAIN POINTS

Introduction

The value of the Principles of War as a guide to Commanders will depend on the understanding of the individual Commander, his knowledge of operational art, and his skill in applying the principles within a particular operational context. While the relative importance of each principle will depend on circumstances, successful application of the Principles of War requires sound military judgement. Failure to take account of these hard-won lessons can lead to failure and defeat.
When considering the ten principles of war, the important thing is to consider them together and not in isolation. The difficulty of making a plan is not how to bring in the principles but how to balance the needs of one against the another, or of a combination of two or three against the requirements of two or three others. Used in this way, in a rough-and-ready fashion, they constitute a useful check-list when studying the past or when planning an operation. They should be looked on in this light and should certainly not be regarded as a magic formula that will provide an answer to all tactical or strategic problems.

In view of the fact that the principles of war are well known, in one form or another, and available to everyone, it is worth looking at two of the most common reasons for their neglect. The main reason is that they are literally neglected because commanders do not study them. The other reason is that commanders frequently set about making plans with a preconceived idea as to the methods they will adopt. These preconceived ideas often spring from following a habit or doctrine evolved for use in circumstances which have subsequently altered. Defining a principle as a guide to conduct, the following are the principles which must always influence a Commander in war.

I. The Selection And Maintenance Of The Aim

The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim must be regarded as the "Master" Principle. It has therefore been placed first. No other principle is as important. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order, since their relative importance will vary according to the nature of the operation in question.

In the conduct of any war as a whole, and in every separate operation in that war, it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim is to break the enemy's will to fight. Each phase of the war and each separate operation must be directed towards this supreme aim (the achievement of the stated aim of the war as a whole), but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts must be directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for a re-appreciation and consequently a new or modified aim. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim.

Every plan of action at every level must be tested by the extent to which it contributes to the achievement of the military aim at the next highest level of command. This leads ultimately to the accomplishment of the overall military aim and hence to the fulfilment of the political aim and the desired end-state. It follows therefore that, the military objectives, which should be attainable, must be directed to achieving the political aim and the intended strategic end-state. Commanders at all levels must know exactly what they are required to achieve and must make that quite clear to their appropriate subordinates. They should not waste effort on courses of action which do not directly, or indirectly, contribute to the attainment of their aim.

II. Maintenance Of Morale

History shows that victory in war depends more on moral or morale than on material or physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to victory in war.

Morale is a mental state but is very sensitive to material conditions. It is based on a clear understanding of the aim, on training and on discipline and is immediately responsive to effective leadership. It is adversely affected by inferior or inefficient equipment and depends to a large degree on sound administration. Outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all other factors are against it and success in battle is the best stimulant of morale.

III. Offensive Action

Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of victory; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken victory is impossible. Offensive action is the chief means open to a commander to influence the outcome of a campaign or operation. It would be virtually impossible to achieve a military aim without taking the offensive. Although defensive actions may have to be fought, ultimate success will probably depend on the offensive use of available forces. Offensive action embodies a state of mind that brings the determination to gain and maintain the initiative and withhold it from the enemy.

IV. Security

A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This involves adequate defence of vulnerable bases, assets, and other interests which are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to victory in war. On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive. A degree of security by physical protection and information denial is essential to all operations. Security should enable friendly forces to achieve their objective despite the enemy’s interference.

V. Surprise

Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence in war and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the effort expended can be obtained, and, in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to victory. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, tactically, or by exploiting new technologies, material or techniques. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity, and speed.

VI. Concentration Of Force

To achieve victory in war it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral and material, to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily mean a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the enemy’s thrusts, directly or indirectly. Concentration of sufficient forces to achieve the decisive or most important task at the time is the cardinal principle in war and conflict. This principle may entail the employment of all available forces. Concentration is a matter more of time than of space.

VII. Economy Of Effort

Related to concentration of force is economy of effort. Economy of effort implies a balanced use of forces, and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the most critical time and place, there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it cannot have a significant impact on the issue at hand. Economy of effort implies that the correct forces matched to the task are available and that forces allocated to a task are carefully balanced.

VIII. Flexibility

Although the aim might not alter, a commander might be required to exercise judgement and flexibility by modifying plans to meet changing circumstances, take advantage of fleeting opportunities, or shift the main effort of the campaign or operations. War demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. Flexibility demands trust, good training, organisation, discipline, and staff work. Above all, when time is of the essence, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision-making on the part of both the Commander and his subordinates which ensures that time is never lost.
To be flexible requires sustainability and a high degree of physical mobility, both strategically and tactically. This ensures that forces can be concentrated, and redeployments can take place, both rapidly and economically, so that the weight of effort can be altered as required at decisive places and times.

IX. Co-Operation

Co-operation is based on team-spirit and entails the co-ordination of all units or activities to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. It is the means by which concentration of force with economy of effort can be achieved. Above all, goodwill and the desire to co-operate are essential at all levels. The interdependence of the services on one another, and on the civilian war effort or agencies, has made co-operation between all of them of vital importance in war. Joint action is best achieved not only within any one service but also among all services and allied forces. Only by full co-operation can the right balance of forces be achieved, and plans devised by the commander be effectively implemented.

X. Administration

The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the Commander the maximum freedom of action in carrying out any plan. Every administrative organization must be simple. Every operational Commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan within his sphere of command, corresponding to the scope of his responsibilities for the operational plan.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS - Listed by different armies or brought together by myself.

XI. Mobility

Mobility, properly exploited, is a potent weapon: when applying it you must consider the overall mobility of your force as well as the correct use of your most mobile units. A force in which the best use is made of the mobility of all types of unit will be all the more ready to exploit openings, to reinforce victory, to close gaps in its ranks and to react swiftly to unexpected enemy moves. Units which combine high mobility with strong combat potential are powerful indeed and should be held for such roles as outflanking manoeuvres and as a strong mobile reserve. Conversely they should not be wasted in defensive or holding roles: your slower units, provided that they are strong enough, should be the secure pivot on which your army manoeuvres. In order that mobility can be used to very best effect remember to make maximum use of road networks and open ground to enhance movement and avoid, whenever possible, committing your main force to areas which will restrict its mobility.

XII. Sustainability

Sustainability covers all aspects of the physical, moral and spiritual maintenance of a force. Sustainability is more than logistics and can also cover all equipment, personnel and industrial support. As a Principle of War, sustainability develops force generation, deployment, operations in theatre, recovery to home base, recuperation and training. Sustainability is also the ability of a force to maintain the necessary fighting power for the time needed to achieve military objectives. The physical and moral sustenance of personnel, the maintenance and repair of equipment and aircraft, the provision of combat supplies and expendable commodities and the treatment, evacuation and replacement of casualties are all aspects of sustainability. Without due regard for all aspects of sustainability, combat-power could be reduced and mission success placed in jeopardy.

XIII. Terrain

Terrain is a neutral opponent to both combatants. It covers such things as climate, geography, and weather. Terrain can arbitrarily effect anything and everything on land, sea, and air. Sometimes the effects of terrain can be anticipated and sometimes they cannot, but they can rarely be ignored. Terrain can act as a force multiplier to the defence, a means to limit or change enemy movement, or as a means to attack or strain the enemy supply lines. The friction imposed by terrain can be enhanced using adequate fortifications and preparations to aid in the planning and execution of operations. Terrain can even aid in surprising the enemy. As such, terrain can be seen as being co-opted to your side as a major aid against the enemy, even upto and including the conquest of large areas of territory for strategic gain.

XIV. Friction

Actual war includes "friction" which chaotically changes, inhibits, or breaks-down, to a greater or lesser degree, all prior arrangements, operations, or movements. Usually a very negative condition and endemic to both sides no matter how successful one or both may be. Often appears amongst the supply lines or very large concentrations of force. Sometimes great success or an advance into enemy territory can lead to the complete break-down of operations without any need for enemy action.

XV. Victory

Strategic: Fulfilling a set goal, or criteria for success, leading to a next step in a plan for total victory.
Tactical: Succeeding in a battle or part of a battle, often by driving the enemy back or holding a position, but not gaining any lasting result from the victory.

XVI. Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is the military term for the active gathering of information about an enemy, or other conditions, by physical observation. Often referred to as recce (British & Commonwealth) or recon (USA), the associated verb is reconnoiter in American English or reconnoitre in British English. Examples of reconnaissance include patrolling by troops, ships, submarines, or aircraft, or by setting up covert observation posts. Reconnaissance may also be carried out by satellites or unmanned aircraft. Espionage is not normally considered to be covered by the term reconnaissance, as reconnaissance involves uniformed military forces operating ahead of the main force, as opposed to non-combatant individuals within the enemy lines. Reconnaissance seeks to collect information about an enemy. This includes types of enemy units, locations, numbers, and intentions or activity. A number of acronyms exist for the information to be gathered - mainly coined by the US - including salt (size, activity, location, and time), salute (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment), sam & doc (strength, armament, movement, deployment, organization, and communications). Thus reconnaissance is a fundamental tactic which helps to build an intelligence picture.

XVII. Reserves

Army reserves are a part of an army which is normally activated only during emergencies such as a war. They differ from a standing army which is composed for full time soldiers. Most of the modern militaries have reserve forces. Reserve forces are helpful in keeping the military expenses low during times of peace. More importantly, units held in reserve are being actively held in preparation for an event or operation, such as exploitation of a breakthrough in the enemy's lines or make a counter-attack against an enemy breakthrough.

XVIII. Tempo

The speed or pace of operations or progression of events. In chess, tempo refers to the time taken by a move. Each move takes one tempo. Thus a player can be said to "lose a tempo" when taking one more move than necessary to achieve something, or to "gain a tempo" when taking only two moves to do what would have taken three by other methods, for example. A simple example of losing a tempo may be moving a rook from a1 to a5 and from there to a8; simply moving from a1 to a8 would have achieved the same result with a tempo to spare. Such manoeuvres do not always lose a tempo however - the rook on a5 may make some threat which needs to be responded to. In this case, since both players have "lost" a tempo, the net result in terms of time is nil, but the change brought about in the position may favour one player more than the other. Gaining tempo may be achieved, for example, by developing a piece while delivering check, though here too, if the check can be countered by the development of a piece, the net result may be nil. If the check can be blocked by a useful pawn move which also drives the checking piece away, the check may even lose a tempo.

In general, making moves with gain of tempo is desirable. A player is said to have the initiative if they are able to keep making moves which force their opponent to respond in a particular way or limit their responses. The player with the initiative has greater choice of moves and can to some extent control the direction the game takes, though this advantage is only relative, and may not be worth very much (having a slight initiative when a rook down, for example, may be worthless). In some endgame situations, a player must actually lose a tempo to make progress. When the two kings stand in opposition, for example, the player to move is often at a disadvantage (zugzwang) and so must triangulate in order to return to the same position but with the opponent to move.

XIX. Mass

Quality is better than quantity, but sufficient quantity has a quality all of its own. The principle of mass - Given all things being equal, sending a single tactical friendly unit to combat a single tactical enemy unit will result in a 50% chance of defeat, resulting in a 1 to 1 loss ratio at the strategic level. However, sending two or more units to combat a single enemy unit will result in a loss ratio of less than 1 to 1.

LEADERSHIP

Principles of Good Leadership - Just For Fun

1/. Achieve professional competence.
2/. Appreciate your own strengths and limitations and pursue self-improvement.
3/. Develop the leadership potential of your followers.
4/. Keep your followers informed of the mission, the changing situation and the overall picture.
5/. Know your soldiers and promote their welfare.
6/. Lead by example.
7/. Make sound and timely decisions.
8/. Make sure that your followers know your meaning and intent, then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission.
9/. Seek and accept responsibility.
11/. Train your soldiers as a team and employ them up to their capabilities.

Principles Of Military Incompetence - We've all been there.

1/. A belief in brute force, rather than the clever ruse.
2/. A belief in mystical forces - fate, bad luck, etc.
3/. A failure to exploit a situation gained and a tendency to 'pull punches' rather than push home an attack.
4/. A failure to make adequate reconnaissance.
5/. A failure to make use of surprise or deception.
6/. A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition.
7/. A predilection for frontal assaults, often against the enemy's strongest point.
8/. A serious wastage of human resources and failure to observe one of the first principles of war - economy of force.
9/. A suppression or distortion of news from the front, usually rationalized as necessary for morale or security.
10/. A tendency to reject or ignore information which is unpalatable or which conflicts with preconceptions.
11/. A tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of one's own side.
12/. An inability to profit from past mistakes (owing in part to a refusal to admit past mistakes).
13/. An obstinate persistence in a given task despite strong contrary evidence.
14/. An undue readiness to find scapegoats for military set- backs.
15/. Indecisiveness and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision-maker.

Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, 1976
      
Randwulf
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 21:39
Sun Tzu was translated by a french Missionary named Father amiot

"Knowledge of Sun Tzu reached Europe shortly before the French Revolution in the form of a summary translation by Father J. J. M. Amiot, a French Jesuit priest."

and is said to have influenced Bonapart and the German General Staff...

Principals of War have grown over the years... and you can see how it has developed...

And yes I agree, Clausewitz is a very DULL read and he knew he was not the best writer and would not publish... his wife did after he died so he could not stop her...

but still a brilliant man... and when we study all these men we become better for it.

Rommel... wrote a book
Guderian... wrote a book
Napoleon wrote his maxiums...

who else? I wish Patton had lived to write a book... his son's was just not the same...





      
Provence
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 21:51
I just ordered the Rommel Papers online. I'll let you know if I ever make it through the book! Gets great reviews and supposedly covers a lot of the battles described in Memoir'44.

What's great with reading miliary history while playing the game is that it makes everything so much more relevant. In the case of the principles of war, it brings them to life. The human element inherent to biographies, absent in theoretical tomes, should make it more readable, I hope...

I also hope to get some inspiration in terms of creating additional scenarios.
      
Mr & Mrs Guderian
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 21:58
Clausewitz is the best that might ever be written, its just so inaccessible. I wonder what he would have published if he had had the time to finish. Definately unappreciated in his time.

Caesar wrote two books. Frontinus, Tacitus and Vegetius also wrote a book (or so) each. Then there was Maurice (I think) who wrote the Strategikon.

Montgomery wrote a few books. Manstein wrote Lost Victories.

I personally would have liked to read a book written by Zhukov, just so I could compare what he wrote to what Manstein & Guderian wrote. Now, that would be interesting.

I don't think that Patton would have written anything. He was too much the man of action. But he would have said a lot, maybe have appeared on TV or done some interviews. Certainly his lectures would have been massively over-booked.
      
Cantatta
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 22:28
Napoleon was an avid reader of Hannibal's battles, admitting his admiration, and even using Hanibal's strategems in his own battles. Napoleon was able to learn very good leassons from history, using them to his great benefit!

I would not doubt that Sun Tzu had his own influence on the Napoleonic wars, either. Many other great generals before that time fought well and left legacies of their own, and lessons to be learned, if one so desires.
      
Nordiskanc
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Re:Principles if War Wed, 11 January 2006 23:27
[quote title=Mr & Mrs Guderian wrote on Wed, 11 January 2006 15:02]Clausewitz is so boring my head falls off. Every time I try to push through it, I either want to kill myself or re-arrange my sock drawer. Its the language really - why use one word, when about a thousand dull ones will do.


Don't talk to many women now do we Razz They have a way of saying little in many words....and don't forget meetings either Laughing

Seriously though, you do need to have a certain mind set to get through "On War", but then again the same can be said about many famous works.
      
Mr & Mrs Guderian
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Re:Principles if War Fri, 13 January 2006 00:34
& Her husband, too. We're married, y'know.

We chose Mr & Mrs Guderian because previously we tried to play Panzergruppe Guderian but she didn't like it. It was a bit flat and dull. But she did like the name so we kept it.

Memoir 44 is much more fun. Its very nostalgic, just what we all really wanted all along, and very easy & quick to play. The rules are simple to explain and understand, which is a BIG plus.

Maybe one day we might try to convert PGG to a Memoir Scenario. Not sure if it could be an overlord played lengthways or a normal game. If we worked-out how to do that then we could also do the whole Market-Garden Operation as well. Something for the future.

We chose the picture because all the other couples from World War Two had unfortunate endings. At least Helga and Otto were fun.
      
Drax Kramer
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Re:Principles if War Sun, 15 January 2006 13:12
Mr & Mrs Guderian wrote on Wed, 11 January 2006 21:58


I personally would have liked to read a book written by Zhukov, just so I could compare what he wrote to what Manstein & Guderian wrote. Now, that would be interesting.


Zhukov did write memoirs, I believe Amazon should have them available.


Drax

[Aktualisiert am: Sun, 15 January 2006 13:13]

      
Mr & Mrs Guderian
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Re:Principles if War Tue, 17 January 2006 23:17
Thanks Drax,

I'll have to see about getting a copy.
      
    
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